Publication | Page 642 | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (2024)

The Afghan Elections and the Bonn Process: Assessing India's Options October 2005 Vishal Chandra

The thrice postponed Afghan parliamentary and provincial council elections are finally over. But, is the Bonn-mandated political process over? With the US intent on cutting down its troop levels in Afghanistan this year, is the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan also over? It is being said that the Bonn process has concluded with the September 18, 2005 elections. If so, then it is pertinent to examine the end-result of the four-year political process and the recently concluded elections. The three landmark events of the process—adoption of a new Constitution by the Loya Jirga in January 2004, the presidential election in October 2004 and the recently concluded September 18 parliamentary elections—pale into insignificance when compared with the conditions prevailing in Afghanistan. The elections have neatly brought out, and to an extent brought back, a complex mix of actors and forces that have defined the socio-political character of Afghan war for over a quarter of a century. The very fact that 2004-05 has been the worst for Afghanistan in terms of levels of violence, drug production and the Taliban onslaught, makes the whole political process and the ‘war on terror’ questionable. It is in the context of the enormous challenges that lie ahead in post-election Afghanistan that India needs to assess its options.

The 159 Million Dollar Elections

Is post-election Afghanistan any different from the pre-election one? It was a foregone conclusion that the new Afghan Parliament would be a motley mix of Islamists, former mujahideen1, drug barons, former Communists2, technocrats, academics, independents, women and the Taliban. The strange mix of candidates that have sprung up from the elections reflects the diversity of stakeholders in the Afghan polity. The victory of some Taliban candidates and their appointment in the Meshrano Jirga (the 102-member upper house) by President Karzai is a notable development.3

The biggest challenge before Presidnet Karzai and his backers is to secure parliamentary approval for his ministerial appoinments. President Karzai’s position in the domestic political calculus remains as precarious as ever. His government will, in all probability, remain dependent on his relationship with the diverse mujahideen factions that have come to dominate the new Afghan Parliament.4 The possibility of power realignments among the different factions to outmanoeuvre one another will continue to be the defining feature of post-election Afghan politics. The 12-party coalition or the National Understanding Front (the Jabha-ye Tafahom-e Melli) formerly led by the Tajik leader Muhammad Yunus Qanuni can become a political force for President Karzai to reckon with.5

The results of the elections6 make it amply clear that President Karzai may have to reshuffle his cabinet to accommodate some more mujahideen or factional commanders, or their proxy candidates, particularly from among the former Northern Alliance (NA). In effect, the technocrats and the independents in the current cabinet may be increasingly replaced by candidates representing the competing interests of various mujahideen factions. President Karzai’s inability to appoint a new interior minister since Ahmed Ali Jalali resigned on September 27, 2005 underlines his difficulties. He is all too aware of the fact that without cutting deals with the various Afghan factions, it would not be possible for Kabul to have even a minimal presence in the provinces. It is difficult to say to what extent Karzai’s attempt to drive divisions in the loosely knit NA, and to turn their inter-factional and intra-faction divides to his advantage in the run-up to the presidential election, has met with success.

However, President Karzai has definitely emerged as a rallying figure in the US and the UN-backed political structure in Kabul, both for the international community and the mujahideen leaders and commanders. It appears that President Karzai and the mujahideen will continue to remain in an inter-dependence mode for times to come. President Karzai will have to continue with his balancing act between the aspirations of the mujahideen and the Islamists on the one hand, and the urgent need to carry out the reforms process on the other.7 But do the Afghan people have the patience for it keeping in view the high level of corruption among the government officials and the slow pace of reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts? The overall electoral process has undoubtedly thrown up new actors in the political set-up in Kabul, who are highly qualified West-oriented professionals and technocrats with no militia behind them. The constant friction between the conservative older mujahideen leadership and the reform-minded pro-West members in the government will continue to test President Karzai’s leadership as before. Therefore, the challenges ahead for Hamid Karzai, whose leadership itself is unique and unconventional in the Afghan context, will not be any different in postelection Afghanistan.

Bonn Process: Concluded or Failed?

The international focus on Afghanistan receded as the Iraq War unfolded. The basic objective of institution-building tapered off as the Bonn process itself failed to institutionalise. The fundamental spirit of the Bonn process was lost as all efforts were diverted towards securing Hamid Karzai’s position in Afghan politics prior to the US presidential elections, and in holding together diverse constituents of the provisional government led by him. As a result, Karzai did emerge as a central figure in the internationally-backed Bonn process, but it also led to the reestablishment and reemergence of the mujahideen leadership who have since been a hindrance to the process of reforms and institution-building.

The US failed to reconcile its interests in Afghanistan and the region with the objectives of the Bonn Agreement.8 Its continued dependence on the militia provided by various mujahideen factions, since the beginning of the Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001, was bound to legitimise an overarching role for the mujahideen leadership in the Bonn process. The reworking of the US-mujahideen nexus to oust their common foe, the Taliban, made the Bonn process more of a US agenda than an Afghan one. All through the four years, mujahideen leaders and commanders have been resisting the idea of disarmament and demobilisation of their private armies. They have also been resisting the idea of anti-narcotics operations as they finance their militias through drug money. Simply put, they are against any idea which would lead to the dilution of their power. With the Afghan national army and police beset with many problems, President Karzai’s authority remains limited and dependent on foreign troops and the cooperation of the mujahideen factions.

The policy objective of the US on counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and political stability in Afghanistan has been an apparent failure. The fact that the Taliban and its allies are far from decimation; that much of the country is still controlled by extra-constitutional authorities; that the levels of violence and casualty have been the highest this year; and that Afghanistan remains the world’s largest illicit opium-poppy producer9 bear testimony to the failure of the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan. Ironically, despite all the dismal facts and statistics, the US role remains indispensable. The US policy towards the Taliban, which has been a mix of outright military action and reconciliation, has a strong bearing on the future of Afghanistan.

The Bonn process may have thus far failed in terms of institutionbuilding and reforms, but the significant role it played in providing a certain framework to the post-9/11 political process in Afghanistan cannot be missed. Compared to previous agreements and accords, the Bonn Agreement was able to ensure the involvement of the UN and the international community in re-building Afghanistan. But the key question, however, remains. What after the elections? What after the Bonn process? With no qualitative change in the situation in the last four years, and with US intent on lowering its presence in Afghanistan, there is a growing skepticism about the future of Afghanistan.

Keeping in view the necessity to build institutions of governance and to carry out reforms, it is imperative to devise a long-term plan under the aegis of the UN for the post-election Afghanistan. The peace and reconstruction process in Afghanistan needs continuity otherwise whatever little has been achieved in the last four years will be conclusively undone. It will be prudent for the international community and the US to realise the folly of re-abandoning Afghanistan.

Assessing India’s Constraints and Options

The challenges and constraints to India’s Afghan policy are immense. The strong element of unpredictability and uncertainty in Afghan politics calls for constant evaluation of India’s options in Afghanistan. The growing Indo-Afghan ties are commensurate with India’s geoeconomic interests both within and beyond the Indian Subcontinent. The perfectly timed visit of the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to Kabul on August 28-29, 2005, just three weeks before the crucial September 18 elections, and the areas of cooperation identified between the two countries, makes it amply clear that India is looking for a tangible and a long-term engagement in Afghanistan.

In fact, India’s engagement in Afghanistan has come a long way since the closure of its embassy in Kabul in September 1996 to the August 2005 visit of the Indian Prime Minister, the first in 29 years. Since the January 2002 Tokyo Conference for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, India has committed an assistance of $550 million. India has been involved in training programmes and in humanitarian and infrastructure development projects in Afghanistan. India’s contribution in the training of Afghan diplomats, judges, police officers, doctors; developing Afghanistan’s civil aviation and transport sectors; construction of roads, dams, hospitals, educational institutions; and in establishing telecom and power transmission lines is a widely acclaimed fact.

Apart from the political uncertainty in Afghanistan and India’s own resource-limitations, the Indo-Afghan relationship is constrained by its geography and the Pakistan factor. Though India is among the leading donors to Afghanistan, clearly the largest in the region, the Indo-Afghan relationship is yet to realise its full potential. The fact that India does not have borders contiguous with Afghanistan puts India into a dependency mode. Pakistan’s refusal to provide overland transit facilities for Indian goods bound for Afghanistan and further to Iran and the Central Asian markets has led to India taking a longer and a circuitous sea route via Iran. Ironically, Pakistan allows Afghanistan to transport its goods bound for India. The delicate nature of the ongoing political process in Afghanistan and the fractious nature of Afghan polity, coupled with Pakistan’s intransigence in facilitating Indo-Afghan trade, are likely to test the resilience of Indo-Afghan ties.

The current challenge before India, given the above constraints, is how to sustain the growing momentum of its relationship with Afghanistan. Some of the viable options before India are:

  • India needs to consolidate and build up on its four years of achievements in Afghanistan by not letting Manmohan Singh’s recent visit become a touch-and-go affair. If India is to reach out to Central Asia and the Gulf region, Indo-Afghan ties have to be high in the order of priority. India should not loose sight of the geostrategic significance of Afghanistan as its growing political and economic interests lie both within the subcontinent and the regions beyond.
  • India should further broad-base its engagement in Afghanistan by promoting greater institutional cooperation between the two countries. Identifying new areas of cooperation and opening new vistas of joint ventures will have to be a continuing process. India needs to engage diverse groups within the civil society in Afghanistan, such as, political parties, intellectuals, NGOs, educational and research institutions, media groups, cultural organisations, businessmen and so on. Given the shared past and civilizational ties between the two countries, the idea of establishing an Indian Cultural Centre in Afghanistan and vice-versa can go a long way in reinvigorating the two countries’ relationship.
  • With Afghanistan now having a newly elected parliament, regular interaction between the parliamentarians can go a long way strengthening the relations between the two governments. India can take the initiative by sending a parliamentary delegation to Kabul to interact with the newly elected Afghan parliamentarians and to subsequently invite them to India.
  • Both bilateral and multilateral approaches are important in India’s contribution to the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
  • Given the uncertainties of Indo-Pak ties, India needs to strengthen the infrastructure which facilitates its trade with Afghanistan via Iran. The construction of Zaranj-Delaram road is a crucial step in the same direction. It will be prudent if alternate routes to Afghanistan and Central Asia, particularly via Iran, are developed and strengthened. Indo-Iranian ties are vital to facilitating trade not only with Afghanistan but also with the Gulf region and Central Asia. India should continue to explore ways of overcoming its geographical limitations by circumventing Pakistan.
  • India needs to build bridges with all the major ethnic groups in Afghanistan. India should balance its relationship with both the Pashtuns and the minority ethnic groups. The idea of engaging anti-India politico-military formations in Afghanistan should not be considered as untenable in the changed and changing scenario in Afghanistan.
  • As Indo-Pak relationship impinges on the relations and the interests of all the three countries—India, Pakistan and Afghanistan—and the regions beyond, viable scope for cooperation between the three countries may be explored. To promote a strong sense of economic cooperation in the region, the political and economic interests of the respective countries will have to be accommodated.

President Karzai had categorically stated during Manmohan Singh’s visit that peace between India and Pakistan is vital for regional security and economic cooperation. During the joint news conference, President Karzai had emphasised, “Afghanistan is very happy to see a dialogue for better relations between India and Pakistan. Afghanistan is directly affected by friendship between the two countries. The improvement of relations between India and Pakistan are such a necessity for the people of this whole region that overtakes every other consideration”.10 Aware of the fact that Pakistan’s cooperation is imperative for any regional effort to root out terrorism, Karzai further remarked that, “India, Pakistan and Afghanistan need to join hands to fight this global menace”.11

However, given Pakistan’s internal political dynamics, it is unlikely that it will or will be able to completely renounce its support for the Taliban and other extremist forces in Afghanistan. Despite the US pressure, Pakistan has not yet given up its policy of exporting, promoting and supporting terrorism in order to further its political agenda against both its eastern and western neighbours. The Taliban rule and events of 9/11 have made it clear that a stable, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan is not only in the interest of India, but also crucial for regional and international security.

India as the world’s largest democracy is playing an important role in supporting democracy, institution-building and in consolidating the achievements of the four-year Bonn process in Afghanistan. In South Asia, India is the only credible country which is in a position to rollback terrorism and religious extremism epitomised by the Taliban movement, in cooperation with the international community. In fact, India’s role in the economic revival of Afghanistan and in promoting regional economic cooperation is an essential prerequisite.

However, much also depends on the US’ future policy in Afghanistan. The inability of the US to address the paradoxes of its ‘war on terror’ has thus far left the political climate in Afghanistan more uncertain and fluid. The persistent divide between the US’ regional agenda and the interest of Afghanistan does not bode well for the latter. US withdrawal from Afghanistan would inevitably lead to a full comeback of those very forces against whom it had resolved to wage war after 9/11. In that sense, the consequences of re-abandoning Afghanistan at this critical juncture will be disastrous. As for India, it will have to wade through the complex maze of Afghan and subcontinental politics, enmeshed with the interests of extraregional powers and actors, to pursue its expanding economic and political interests. For now, growing Indo-Afghan relationship is a reality.

References/End Notes

  • 1. Often referred to as ‘warlords’ or ‘regional strongmen’.
  • 2. Former communist General Noor-ul-haq Alomi from Kandahar; former interior minister in the Soviet -backed communist government in the 1980s, Syed Muhammad Gulabzoi from Khost; former deputy minister, Babrak Shinwari from Nangarhar; former advisor to President Najibullah, Kabir Ranjbar from Kabul are among the important former communists who won the elections.
  • 3. The notable among the former members of the Taliban who won seats in the Wolesi Jirga (the lower house) are ex-commander Haji Mullah Abdul Salaam Rocketi from Zabul, ex-provincial governor Mawlavi Mohammad Islam Mohammadi from Samangan and a senior former security official Hanif Shah Al-Hussein from Khost. As for the Meshrano Jirga (the upper house), Arsala Rahmani, the deputy minister for religious affairs in the former Taliban Government from Paktiya Province, is among the 34 members recently appointed by President Karzai. Other important appointees to the Meshrano Jirga are the former defence minister and leader of the Tajik militia, Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim from Panjshir; Sebghatullah Mojadeddi from Kabul; and Sher Muhammad Akhund, the governor of Helmand Province.
  • 4. The notable among the former mujahideen leaders and commanders elected to the Wolesi Jirga are Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf of Ittehad-e-Islami (renamed as Tanzime Dawat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan), Haji Mohammad Mohaqqiq and Mohammad Yonus Qanuni from Kabul; Padshah Khan Zadran from Paktiya; Haji Hazarat Ali from Nangarhar; Pir Sayed Ishaq Gailani of Nahzat-e Hambastagi-ye Melli-ye Afghanistan from Paktika; and Burhan-ud Din Rabbani of Jamiat-e-Islami from Badakhshan.
  • 5. Muhammad Yunus Qanuni has stepped down as the leader of the National Understanding Front or Jabha-ye Tafahom-e Melli after being elected as the Chairman of the Wolesi Jirga or the lower house of the Afghan national assembly on December 21, 2005. Former Afghan president and Jamiat-e-Islami leader Burhan-ud Din Rabbani, who withdrew his candidacy for the chairmanship of the Wolesi Jirga in favour of Qanuni, is likely to be the new opposition leader. See “Qanuni Steps Down From Opposition Leadship” at http://www.azadiradio.org/ en/news/2005/12/13385C33-584A-4E7F-93B7-2DE69EB99647.ASP
  • 6. The complete details of the election process and the final certified results of the elections to the Wolesi Jirga (the Lower House), the Provisional Councils and the Meshrano Jirga (the Upper House) are available at http://www.jemb.org/
  • 7. Also see Vishal Chandra, “Warlords and Karzai’s Balancing Act”, Strategic Analysis, 29(1), January-March 2005. pp. 155-161.
  • 8. The Bonn Agreement, formally known as Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, was signed on December 5, 2001. The four Afghan groups invited to the Bonn Conference (Nov 27-Dec 05, 2001) were – Peshawar Group, the Northern Alliance, Rome Group and the Cyprus Group, each representing varying background and political interests. The text of the Agreement is available at http:// www. u n a m a - a f g . o r g / d o c s / _ n o n U N % 2 0 D o c s / _ I n t e r n a t i o n - Conferences&Forums/Bonn-Talks/bonn.htm. Also at http://www.uno.de/frieden/ afghanistan/talks/agreement.htm
  • 9. For further details see Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004 released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes and the Counter Narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afghanistan in November 2004, at http://www.unodc.org/ pdf/afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2004.pdf
  • 10. Yousuf Azimy, “Karzai Says Better India-Pakistani Ties Vital”, at http:// www.swissinfo.org/sen/swissinfo.html?siteSect=143&sid= 6042952&cKey= 1125227124000.
  • 11. Makia Monir and Zubair Babakarkhail, “New Delhi Assures Kabul of All-Out Support Against Terrorism”, at http://www.pajhwok.com/en/news/ viewStory.asp?lng=eng&id=6553
South Asia Afghanistan, India, Elections, Jamaat-e-Islami, India-Afghanistan Relations Prime Minister's Moscow Visit October 2005 Jyotsna Bakshi

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Moscow from December 4-6, 2005 highlights the continued importance of Indo-Russian cooperation in a changing geopolitical scenario. Beginning with President Vladimir Putin’s first visit to India in October 2000, bilateral summits between the Indian Prime Minister and the Russian President, alternatively in each other’s capital, have become an annual feature. In contrast, President Putin’s predecessor, President Boris Yeltsin visited India only once, in January 1993. Undoubtedly, the coming to power of President Putin has reinvigorated India-Russia ties. Given the current geostrategic imperatives, Russia needs to actively involve India in Eurasia as much as India needs to ensure that the Eurasian political space is filled up by friendly powers. At the same time, both India and Russia realise the importance of extensively engaging all other major and regional players.

In a changing world kaleidoscope, the geopolitical interests of India and Russia tend to converge rather than clash with each other. In a statement to the press at the conclusion of his visit, Dr Manmohan Singh spoke of the need “to anticipate what measures we need to take to meet new and emerging opportunities for further strengthening of our strategic partnership, in meeting our respective national priorities as well as in pooling our efforts in sharing global responsibilities”.

Dr Manmohan Singh gave the assurance of India’s support for Russia’s accession to WTO (World Trade Organisation) and emphasised that the bilateral Accession Agreement shall be concluded at the earliest. President Putin responded by stating that “Russia welcomes the fact that India has the status of observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. We intend to work closely with our Indian partners in the multilateral organizations in the Asia-Pacific region.” Russia has also been persistently pushing tripartite interaction among the three largest states of the continent: Russia, India and China. Consequently, a mechanism of regular interaction among the foreign ministers of the three countries during the UN General Assembly sessions in September of each year has been established. The three foreign ministers additionally met at Vladivostok in June 2005 and are slated to meet in New Delhi in 2006. On the issues of combating international terrorism, religious extremism and drugs and arms trafficking, India and Russia have similar interests and have been cooperating with each other. The two leaders also discussed the Iranian nuclear programme currently and expressed the hope that the issue would be resolved at the level of IAEA.

Bilateral Indo-Russian cooperation has traditionally covered a wide spectrum of areas. Summit meetings provide new impulse and momentum to the existing ties as well as an opportunity to revisit and rediscover the potential for furthering mutually beneficial cooperation. In preparation for the Prime Minister’s visit, discussions on the India-Russia Joint Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation and the Joint commission on Military Technical cooperation had already taken place.

Military-Technical Cooperation: Collaboration in Design, Development and Production of Next Generation Weapons

The two countries are signatories to the long-term military and technical cooperation agreement up to 2010. India is a major buyer of Russian military equipment. According to the Russian paper Kommersant, India accounts for some 40 per cent of Russian arms exports and the total value of military contracts with Russia under the present military-technical cooperation agreement is nearly $ 10 billion.1 During his visit to Moscow in mid-November, 2005, Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee indicated the possibility of further renewal of the long-term military-technical programme with Russia after the expiry of the current 10-year programme in 2010.2 In recent years India-Russia military-technical cooperation is changing from the earlier buyer-seller relationship to joint research and development of high-tech weapons. Joint development of Brahmos antiship cruise missile is an example of jointly developed technologies. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that during the visit a “comprehensive review” was undertaken of the long-standing India-Russia military technical cooperation and reiterated, “Our perspective, however, is to move towards collaborative projects involving design, development and production of the next generation military products”. During the Prime Minister’s visit, it was announced that India and Russia will collaborate in the development and production of the fifth generation fighter aircraft as well as multi-role transport aircraft. The signing of the IPR (Intellectual Property Right) agreement appears to have finally cleared the stage for the launching of the projects now.

For the past couple of years, Russia had been insisting on the signing of IPR agreement before further cooperation involving technologies. The agreement on mutual protection of intellectual property rights in bilateral military-technical cooperation was eventually signed during this visit. By signing the accord, India has calmed Russian apprehensions regarding their technology falling in the hands of third parties. This comes at a time when India is actively seeking to diversify and broaden its defence supplies as well as Russian fears of the technology being duplicated in the local markets. In keeping with the Indian position, the accord will apply only to new deals and will not have any retrospective effect.3

Among the planned acquisitions, two are important—the purchase of an aircraft carrier and the lease of two nuclear powered submarines. On January 20, 2004 after years of negotiations and hard bargaining it was finally announced that India would purchase the retrofitted Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov. The Indian media subsequently published the story that the “bonus” offered with the Gorshkov deal was one of long lease of two nuclear-powered project 971 Shchuka-B class nuclear submarines to Indian Navy, from which Russia subsequently backed out so as not to displease the US.4 Although the officials of the two countries are naturally silent on the issue, commenting on the Prime Minister’s visit, Vladimir Radyuhin wrote in The Hindu (December 7, 2005) that the Russian sources have indicated the lease of nuclear-propelled submarines to India is also in the pipeline. Under a $ 1.8 billion contract for a ten year lease, the Russian side has resumed the construction of the subs, which was frozen in the 1990s. In October this year 200 Indian naval officers have started training at a submarine training centre at Sosnovij Bor near St Petersburg.

Vladimir Radyuhin also reported that India-Russia defence cooperation would acquire a new dimension with the joint use of the Aini air base north of capital Dushanbe in Tajikistan. The Aini base was repaired and modernized by India during the Afghan civil war between the Taliban forces and the Northern Alliance. It has been reported that Russian combat aircraft and helicopters shall be stationed at the Aini air base. It is not yet clear whether Indian Air Force too will have a presence.

Nuclear Energy Issue: Russia Maintains Ranks with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

In keeping with the Soviet-era agreement, Russia is building two 1000 MW reactors at Kudankulam nuclear power plant in Tamil Nadu. The Kudankulam power station will be commissioned in 2007-08. There have been reports of the likelihood of Russia building more reactors for Kudankulam as well as other projects. However, in view of restrictions imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, there has been little progress in this field. It is hoped that the July 18, 2005 Indo-US nuclear agreement, when implemented, will remove restrictions on India’s wider cooperation with other countries. The Indo-Russia cooperation on peaceful use of nuclear energy will get a boost. In fact, India has been urging Russia to take the initiative in persuading the NSG to remove the restrictions. Russia, having acknowledged the July 18 Indo-US agreement on civilian nuclear energy,5 has in turn told India to take up the matter with the US first.6

In 2001, Russia had supplied 50 tonnes of low-enriched uranium for the Tarapur nuclear power plant. On the eve of his departure for Moscow, Dr Manmohan Singh, in keeping with the spirit of the Indo-US July 18 agreement, had sought to de-link the issue of the supply of low-enriched uranium for Tarapur power plant from the larger issue of NSG removing restrictions. However, Moscow has refused to supply more uranium for Tarapur plant citing NSG rules. Russia appears to be unwilling to break ranks with other members of the NSG on the nuclear issue this time. Speaking to the press on December 6, 2005, President Putin made it clear that further cooperation between India and Russia depended on the former’s agreement with the NSG and the separation of its military and civilian nuclear programmes as stipulated in the July 18 India-US declaration.

Cooperation in Hydrocarbon Energy Sector

India’s quest for energy security has provided an added impetus to its ties with Russia – the world’s second largest producer and exporter of hydrocarbons. It seems Russia, on its part, would like to invite several countries—including Japan, India, China and South Korea—to develop its vast oil and gas reserves in Siberia and the Far East that require billions of dollars of investments and new technologies. Russia would like to maintain a geo-political balance while inviting prospective partners for the development of hydrocarbon resources rather than depend on any single partner, particularly from its immediate neighbourhood. As regards Indian energy interests in Russia, one of India’s largest overseas investments is a 20 per cent share in Sakhalin-I oil project, which has already come on stream. There are reports of likely Indian investment in Sakhalin–III project as well as other East Siberian oil and gas projects. ONGC and its subsidiary Oil Videsh Ltd (OVL) have ties with major Russian oil and gas companies like Rosneft, Gazprom and LUKoil. On its part, Gazprom has a contract for developing gas-bearing offshore block in the Bay of Bengal on a production sharing basis. Indian and Russian research institutions are also cooperating in the study of gas hydrates and other technology related issues in the energy sector.

Cooperation in Space

During the visit an Agreement was signed between the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roskosmos) and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) on cooperation on the Coronas-Photon project in the area of solar physics and solar-terrestrial relations. This, to recall, was a Soviet-era project, which had been frozen owing to the lack of funds on the Russian side. Apparently, the two countries have decided to resume the joint research.7

Another Agreement signed between the Russian Federation and India was on measures to protect technology during long-term cooperation in joint development, operation and use of the GLONASS global navigation system for peaceful purposes.8 During President Putin’s visit to India in December 2004, an agreement was signed between Roskosmos and ISRO on the joint use of Soviet-era Global Navigational Satellite System (GLONASS) by making it fully functional by joint efforts, including the launching of new Russian satellites from Indian launch pads with the help of Indian vehicles. In February 2005, the Indian Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs ratified GLONASS. The deal entailed India to reduce its dependence on the US GPS (Global Positioning System.9 In his commentary on the agreements signed during Prime Minister’s December visit, Vladimir Radyuhin has remarked that Russia’s GLONASS system shall be used by both the countries for civil and military purposes.10

Lagging Trade and Economic Ties

India-Russia trade and economic ties are the weakest link in otherwise strong relations. Their bilateral trade of just $1.9 billion does not correspond to the size of the economies of the two countries. Not surprisingly, considerable importance was given to reinvigorating economic ties. A 15- member business delegation led by CII (Confederation of Indian Industries) and FICCI (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry) accompanied the Prime Minister and Dr Manmohan Singh addressed an Indo-Russian business meet on December 5. Following the Soviet disintegration, systemic upheaval and economic dislocation in Russia resulted in the disruption of established patterns of economic relations. During this period, India was also preoccupied with its economic reforms. Consequently, the trade between the two sharply declined. However, the economies of the two countries are now registering on an average 7 per cent GDP growth annually. The earlier rupee-rouble trade arrangement is now being replaced by market mechanisms. Indian export basket comprising traditional items can be diversified and expanded to reflect the new strengths of Indian economy. With the rise in oil prices, Russia currently is flush with petro-dollars that may be invested in productive sectors. The two sides are also in the process of finalising an agreement whereby the remaining rupee debt funds may be turned into Russian investment in India. It is hoped that the growth in the two economies would provide a stimulus to the expansion of business ties. As the Prime Minister said in the meeting with the press on December 6, the two sides have decided to set up a Joint Study Group to examine the feasibility of a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement between the two countries.

References

  • 1. RIA Novosti, November 18, 2005.
  • 2. The Hindu, November 18, 2005.
  • 3. The Hindu, April 27, 2005.
  • 4. Hindustan Times, December 8, 2008.
  • 5. “Russia endorses nuclear pact between US and India” at http://www.indiadefence. com/reports/368, September 16, 2005.
  • 6. Dadan Upadhyay in Indian Express, October 24, 2005.
  • 7. The Hindu, December 7, 2005. The Hindu, December 7, 2005.
  • 8. www.kremlin.ru, December 6, 2005.
  • 9. “India and Russia set to boost space cooperation” at www.indiainfo.com, May 13, 2005.
  • 10. The Hindu, no. 7.
Europe and Eurasia India, Defence Cooperation, India-Russia Relations The Emperor Has (no) Clothes? An Autopsy October 2005 Deba R. Mohanty

Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (Penguin Books, New York, 2005), pp. 386.

Deepak Lal, In Praise of Empires: Globalization and Order (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004), pp. 270.

Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Super Power Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, 2002), pp. 222.

G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton University Press, Princeton N. J., 2001), pp. 293.

I – Imperial Power as a Problem Statement

The term ‘Empire’ and its conceptualisation thereof have been debated by scholars for long. The debate continues till date and is likely to be so in the foreseeable future, till at least a satisfactory explanation emanates from it. While the Marxist-Leninist school of thought, contextualising it under various stages of evolution of society, explains it as the highest form of capitalism, eventually leading to the withering away of the state system and bringing in a classless society, liberals and others have found it difficult to explain the broad contours of imperialism. In the absence of a generally agreed definition, contemporary scholarship, especially in the West, tends to explain the term by taking into account relative economic, political and military capabilities of a particular state vis-à-vis others. Inherent ambiguities in such efforts invariably lead to coinage of many other terms like ‘superpower’, ‘hyperpower’, ‘hegemon’, ‘colossus’, or ‘primacy’. Problems in definitions and approximate calculus of power notwithstanding, contemporary scholarship in the West has been pondering over the nature and direction of American power and its implications for the rest of the world.

With the end of the Cold War, the US established its global supremacy. Although military efforts by states around the world, including the US, witnessed drastic reductions in practically every sector of activity, the overall outcome has resulted in the growing power gap between the only superpower and the rest. On the eve of the 21st century, the US had amassed so much of power and such unprecedented levels of global reach, that it was already referred to be the undisputed ‘colossus’ for the next several decades. Yet, at the very beginning of the dawn, a globally active non-state actor – Al Qaida – proved how vulnerable America could be.

The debate about the nature and likely future direction of American power has, in recent times, preoccupied the minds of scholars. While some have compared and contrasted current American power with the imperial powers in the past and come to near conclusions about the superiority of the former in many respects, others have argued that such massive accumulation of power in one country could lead to unbridled brazenness directly or indirectly on the global community and could even lead to serious internal vacuum, implications of which could be disastrous for both the US and the world at large.

Is the US a real Empire? If so, what are its broad features? Does the US behave like an Empire? If so, what are the evidences and resultant implications of such behaviour? Is the world with such an Empire desirable or will the world be better off without it? These are some of the many fundamental questions that scholars and thinkers have been contemplating for quite some time. The quest to find reasonable answers to such trivial queries seems insatiable. Yet, recent scholarship has tried to offer some tentative explanations as well as a few suggestive pointers to such questions. As the complex universe of ‘Empire Project’ blends both subjective and objective determinants, a review of even a few critical studies becomes all the more important.

An attempt has been made here to review four significant works on aspects of Imperial power and more specifically of the power of the US. All four scholars are well known in their fields of activity. Niall Ferguson is currently a Professor of International History at Harvard University and has at least a dozen well acclaimed books to his credit, most of which display precisely distilled arguments based on important historical evidences. Professor Ferguson’s latest book, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire, examines the pros and cons of American imperialism. Deepak Lal is the James S. Coleman Professor of International Studies at the UCLA. As a seasoned development economist with long years of advisory experience with many international agencies as well as various governments, his book, In Praise of Empire: Globalisation and Order explores the twin themes of empires and globalisation and discusses the place of the US in the current global order. Professor Joseph S. Nye Jr. serves as the Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He, like the previous two, needs no introduction. His book, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Super Power Can’t Go It Alone, argues that ‘hard power’ must be blended with ‘soft power’ for a super power like the US to advance and realize its national interests. G. John Ikenberry is Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University. Professor Ikenberry’s scholastic work, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars applies institutional theory of order formation and examines the problem of order in a global context and more importantly, the role of the US in it after the Cold War, especially in the later part of his book.

II – The Grand US Empire Project

The US today is in many ways like an Imperial power. It is vastly wealthy. The might of its wealth is self-evident. It is militarily peerless, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Half a trillion dollar devoted to military efforts by the US in 2004-05 says it all. It has a huge cultural reach. Its reach is evident from the fact that even the farthest corner of or the smallest state in the world at least subconsciously thinks about it while taking any major decision. In a span of just four years, Americans have intervened militarily against three states in the Balkans, Southern Asia, and the Middle East. As both Ferguson and Nye Jr. argue that whatever the rationale, each US incursion has led to a change of political regime, military occupation, and an attempt at institutional transformation euphemistically described as nation-building. Yet by comparison with other empires, it often struggles to impose its will beyond its shores. Reasons for this are many. Its successes in exporting American institutions and values to foreign lands have been outnumbered by its utter failures.

In many respects, this American predominance shares the same aspirations and ambitions as the last British Empire. Despite originating in a revolt against British imperialism, the US inherited many of its begetter’s defining characteristics. Styling itself as an “empire of liberty,” the fledgling Republic embarked on an astonishingly rapid colonisation of the central belt of the North American continent. If anything, the independent Americans expropriated indigenous peoples even more ruthlessly than they had as British subjects. However, as Ferguson argues, the differences between the British and American empires became more apparent as the US sought to extend its influence overseas. Its experiment with overt imperialism after 1898 had distinctly mixed results, ending unhappily in both the Pacific and the Caribbean, with the notable exceptions of Hawaii and Puerto Rico. The grand American project of ‘expanding liberty’ is continuing till date. If President Bush’s speech to the Republican Party Convention, spelt out in the New York Times on September 2, 2004 and myriads of many such avowals convey anything, it is “the story of America is the story of expanding liberty”. Putting in noble terms, “merica is not an Imperial Power”, yet crudely put, “it is a liberating power”, both Ferguson and Nye Jr. suggest that the differences in the meaning are starkly distinctive – the notion of expanding liberty is almost equated to Uncle Sam’s tyranny on the vanquished.

The US has invaded and occupied many countries over the past two centuries. Yet in terms of their economic and political institutions, relatively few of these have evolved into anything remotely resembling miniature Americas or even shown to have followed the basics of democracy. Will things go any better in Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Iraq? And can President Bush live up to his implied threats to deal sooner or later with the other members of the “axis of evil,” Iran and North Korea – to say nothing of Cuba, Libya, and Syria, which were added to the list of ‘rogue states’ in May 2002, or Burma and Zimbabwe, also singled out for presidential opprobrium in November 2003? At the moment, simply imposing order in Iraq is proving difficult enough, even with British and Polish assistance. The Grand American ‘roadmap’ after years of noble efforts still seems like a chimera.

The half-hearted and at times foolhardy adventures at several places seem to exemplify the limits of American power. But how does one explain these limits? Ferguson, Nye Jr. and Ikenberry have explored these limits at length in their respective works. By most conventional measures of power— economic, military, and cultural—there has never been an empire mightier than the US today. Its recent difficulties in achieving its foreign policy goals cannot simply be blamed on the Bush Administration’s alleged diplomatic ineptitude, as argued by Lal. Rather, one needs fundamentally to rethink what one means by power. Often the very concept gets confused with that of other quite different things—wealth, weaponry, and a winning way with “soft power.” It is, in fact, perfectly possible to have a great deal of all these things, yet to have only limited power.

At least three fundamental deficits together explain why the US has been a less effective imperial power than its British predecessor. Ferguson says that they are its economic deficit, its manpower deficit, and – the most serious of the three – its attention deficit. The US has gone from being a net international creditor to being the world’s biggest debtor: its net international liabilities are now equivalent to around a quarter of its gross domestic product. America’s reliance on foreign capital is a balancing act on a very high wire. One plausible and troubling scenario is that foreign expectations could shift, leading to simultaneous pressure on the exchange rate and bond prices, with higher yields threatening American growth via mortgage rates and the housing market. But then, if Dick Cheney’s explanation, “Reagan proved that deficits do not matter”, is taken seriously, then something somewhere is definitely wrong in Uncle Sam’s thinking. Equally troubling is America’s manpower deficit. There is undoubtedly something perplexing about the apparent shortage of American combateffective troops at a time when the American prison population exceeds 2 million – 14 times the number of American troops in Iraq. Of the three deficits, however, it is the third that may prove the most difficult to overcome – namely, the attention deficit that seems to be inherent in the American political system and that already threatens to call a premature halt to reconstruction in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This is not intended as a term of abuse. The problem is systemic; it is the way the political process militates against farsighted leadership. Perhaps going back to understand the basics of ‘power’ and ‘morality’ and institutionalising both, could offer some help, as suggested by Ikenberry.

Does imperial denial matter? Ferguson argues that it does. Successful empire is seldom solely based on coercion; there must be some economic dividends for the ruled as well as the rulers, if only to buy the loyalty of local elites, and these dividends need to be sustained for a significant length of time. The trouble with an empire in denial, as argued by Ferguson, is that it tends to make two mistakes when it chooses to intervene in the affairs of lesser states. The first may be to allocate insufficient resources to the non-military aspects of the project. The second, and the more serious, is to attempt economic and political transformation in an unrealistically short time frame. At the moment, the US would seem to be making these mistakes in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These two points help explain why this vastly powerful economy, with its extraordinary military capability, has had such a disappointing record when it has sought to bring about changes of political regime abroad.

III – Strategic Retreat or Engagement in a Global Village

Traditional, non-traditional or transnational threats such as war, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and organised crime – to say nothing of disease pandemics, climate change, and water shortages – put a premium on cooperation, not competition, between states. Lal and Ferguson have dealt with these at length. The attractions of unilateralism are undeniable, since demanding allies can be more irksome than invisible foes, but a solo strategy offers little prospect of victory against any of these challenges; the successful prosecution of the “wars” against all of them depends as much on multilateral institutions as does the continuation of international free trade, as argued by all the authors. A great empire cannot live in splendid isolation. The isolationist strategy that the US followed during the initial phase of its civilization does not seem viable in today’s international conditions. In fact, American success after both the Second World War and the Cold War was closely linked to the creation, nurturing and extension of international institutions that at once limited and yet legitimised American power. The Kansas farmer’s observation, “I think we are trying to run the business of the world too much” is fine but its broad contours, if weaved into the mainstream thinking, could certainly spell disaster both for the US and others. On the other hand, a judicious combination of realist and liberal-institutional traditions forming the core of American grand strategy could well be contemplated by the American scholarship.

All empires devote a large chunk of financial resources for both internal and external stability. Without hefty investment in enforcing the rule of law, countries like Afghanistan and Iraq will stagnate and perhaps disintegrate. More importantly, nation-building with democratic values at the core is always a long arduous road that needs not only long-term involvement but also periodic assessment, as argued by Ikenberry and Lal. Afghanistan and Iraq being two important test cases for the grand American democracy project have thus far shown very little signs of assimilating alien ideas. Unless the US is prepared to radically alter its attitudes towards low-intensity conflict, it will have little option but to cooperate with the more generous Europeans. Unilateralism, like isolation, is not so splendid after all. Indeed, it is seldom a realistic option for an empire. The danger is that great-power cooperation could simply break down, not because of rivalry between the US and the European Union but because both lack the will to act beyond their own borders. The internal problems of these huge and complex entities may simply distract them from the problems of failed states and rogue regimes. In brief, as Nye Jr. argues, empires do desire to have complete control over the areas they dominate but seldom do they care to at least understand the nuances of long historical and local culture of their subjects. The distinctly modern ideas that flow from them rarely transform, although impinging in some segments, the local culture. The dual process of cultural imposition from outside power and the consequent process of assimilation within the society takes many a decade.

The paradox of globalisation is that, as the world becomes more integrated, so power becomes more diffuse. As Lal and Nye Jr. suggest, thanks to the dynamism of international capitalism, all but the poorest people in the world have significantly more purchasing power than their grandfathers dared dream of. The means of production were never more productive or – as China and India achieve their belated economic takeoffs – more widely shared. Thanks to the spread of democracy, a majority of people in the world now have markedly more political power. The democratic means of election were never more widely accepted as the optimal form of government. The means of education too are accessible in most countries to much larger shares of the population than was the case two or three generations ago; more people than ever can harness their own brainpower. All these changes mean that the old monopolies on which power was traditionally based—monopolies on wealth, political office, and knowledge—have in large measure been broken up. Unfortunately, thanks to the proliferation of modern means of destruction, the power to inflict violence has also become more unevenly diffused.

IV – Emperor’s Liberal Dilemma

Critics of the great empires in general and the American imperial power in particular have singled out almost all the problems associated with imperialism, many of which have been expressed in the works of Ikenberry and Nye Jr. The list is endless as well as often so subjectively intertwined that even the imperial power itself becomes clueless about its duties. Take, for example, the case of exporting democratic values of an imperial power beyond its shores. Exporting democracy is a classic case of imperial dilemma. It has had success in the cases of Germany and Japan, yet its failure cases are too numerous to mention here. More than the willingness of the exporter, it is the willingness of the importer, the degree of which roughly weighs the success or failure of such projects. Would Iraq and Afghanistan, having long historical aversion to democratic traditions be prepared to embrace democracy? The answer seems as philosophically confusing as the query itself. What then does the imperial power do? Should it stop exporting democratic values, which as a desirable concept needs diffusion especially in the traditional societies? If so, how to undertake such difficult projects and taste success? Both the case for promotion of democracy and that too by an imperial power invariably invite criticism for obvious reasons.

Ferguson says that the world needs an effective liberal empire and that the US is the best candidate for the job. Economic globalisation is working. The rapid growth of per capita incomes in the world’s two most populous countries, China and India, means that international inequality is finally narrowing. But there are parts of the world where legal and political institutions are in a condition of such collapse or corruption that their inhabitants are effectively cut off from any hope of prosperity. And there are states that, through either weakness or malice, encourage terrorist organisations committed to wrecking a liberal world order. The number of such states, despite best efforts, is indeed increasing.

The US has good reasons to play the role of liberal empire, both from the point of view of its own security and out of straightforward altruism. In many ways too it is uniquely well equipped to play it, as observed by Ferguson. Yet for all its colossal economic, military, and cultural power, the US still looks unlikely to be an effective liberal empire without some profound changes in its economic structure, its social makeup, and its political culture. Most importantly, as Ikenberry and Nye Jr. suggest, all Americans should ask themselves whether they themselves are willing to change at least in the mental and socio-spiritual realms in order to gain more legitimacy from the societies that they wish to transform? Whatever they choose to call their position in the world – hegemony, primacy, predominance, or leadership – Americans should recognise the functional resemblance between Anglophone power present and past and should try to do a better rather than a worse job of policing an unruly world than their British predecessors. In learning from the history of other empires, Americans will learn not arrogance but precisely that humility which, as a candidate for the presidency, George W. Bush once recommended to his countrymen. And finally, the question Americans must ask themselves is just how transient they wish their predominance to be. Although the barbarians have already knocked at the gates and even threatened to inflict the worst damage, relative imperial endurance or decline seems more likely to come from within than without.

Resolution of North Korean Imbroglio September 21, 2005 C Uday Bhaskar

The breakthrough achieved on September 19 at the six-party (US, North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia and Japan) talks in Beijing has the potential to satisfactorily resolve the North Korean nuclear imbroglio that has been festering since 2002 when Pyongyang unilaterally withdrew from the international agreements that it had entered into over its domestic nuclear programme.

In the intervening three years, North Korea had been identified as part of the 'axis of evil' and the Bush administration has held a series of talks under the six party banner – in vain – till the breakthrough of September 19.

Paradoxically, this encouraging development has come about at a time when the major nuclear powers are grappling with the Iranian nuclear issue and the perceived violations of treaty commitments by Tehran – an issue that is now being deliberated upon at the IAEA in Vienna.

At the heart of both the issues lies the purported clandestine nuclear weapon programme being pursued by North Korea and Iran – which is a transgression of their non-nuclear weapon status as per the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that both states had voluntarily entered into.

North Korea had withdrawn from the NPT in January 2003 – which is legally permissible – since it believed that its supreme national interest was being threatened by what it has often described as US hegemony in the region. Intelligence reports have referred to Pyongyang seeking to extract weapon grade fissile material from the spent fuel in its nuclear reactors and inspections by the IAEA have been suspended by North Korea which has taken recourse to self-imposed isolation.

In the interim, Pyongyang had also declared that it has acquired nuclear weapons and this exigency can have tectonic implications in the tenuously maintained strategic balance of North East Asia with the possibility of Japan deciding to break its nuclear taboo – which would have a cascading effect in terms of the reaction from Beijing and Seoul.

The nuclear issue itself has become more animated since 9/11 and the US determination about Iraq and its quest for weapons of mass destruction. Hence the urgent import accorded to North Korea and innumerable talks over the last three years have finally led to the current breakthrough – though it needs to be reiterated that these are a set of principles that have to be implemented by all concerned.

This is not the first time that such a modus vivendi has been attempted and the Clinton administration tried in all sincerity – but failed with its energy cum security package.

It may be premature to conclude that the North Korean issue has been resolved in a permanent manner and that NE Asia will finally find its own strategic equipoise. What have been agreed to are a set of principles and the phased manner of the implementation includes assuaging of the security anxieties of all the interlocutors – principally North Korea, US and Japan – and at a remove South Korea.

In turn, North Korea will be offered an energy package enabled by South Korea and the culmination will be a verifiable dismantling of Pyongyang's nuclear weapon programme – and its final re-entry into the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Past experience would suggest that there can be mini obstacles and major hurdles to cross before the September 19 agreement is seen as a done deed. Certain differences have already cropped up over the light water reactors to be provided to North Korea and more banana peels will surface when the US Congress deals with the matter.

However, what emerges from the North Korean success is the increasing relevance of China in playing the role of an effective peace-broker in matters nuclear. China's role in tacitly enabling North Korea in its nuclear-missile programmes is one of the more complex post-Cold war challenges and it is evident that Beijing is now demonstrating its ability to play the role of a 'responsible' power when it so desires. From the sequence of meetings held with North Korea over the last three years, one may infer that the US and its allies, including Russia, were not in a position to prevail upon Pyongyang – and Beijing's intervention was necessary. The related extrapolation is that just as China's economic and trade relevance is now acknowledged within the region – and beyond – its strategic footprint is also being enhanced in a calibrated manner.

With North Korea moving towards a putative, consensual resolution, global attention will now shift to Iran, which is of more immediate and proximate relevance to India. Unlike the North Korean case, there are many divergences as far as Iran is concerned. While being an NPT signatory as a non-nuclear weapon state, Tehran has never claimed that it is seeking nuclear weapons or threatened to leave the NPT fold - actions that Pyongyang took. Most intelligence estimates suggest that Iran has been pursuing a covert programme for about 15 years as regards enrichment that goes beyond the rubric of peaceful use of nuclear energy and Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf recently admitted that the AQ Khan network had indeed enabled Iran in its covert nuclear programme.

Thus there is a great deal of opacity about the Iranian nuclear profile and Tehran has refused to accept greater intrusive inspections in its domestic nuclear facilities. Consequently, the global community led by the US is seeking to have the matter referred to the UN Security Council for a more robust and muscular response to contain nuclear proliferation and the matter is still being deliberated upon within the IAEA. Interestingly, while the US and the EU states have taken a certain position apropos the Iranian nuclear programme and Russia is veering around to the same, China has been very circumspect – till now. Whether China will enable Iran to acquire rudimentary nuclear weapon capability or join the other declared nuclear weapon powers in persuading Tehran to emulate Pyongyang will perhaps be the swing factor in the Iranian impasse. The deeper contestation is one between the US and China about whose influence will prevail in the volatile southern Asian region, which, apart from its hydrocarbon index, is emerging as the new theatre of strategic relevance. It is currently animated by the triad of critical global determinants – namely terrorism and religious radicalism, nuclear proliferation and energy stability. India is still a tangential player in these deliberations but it will have to monitor them with the utmost care. North Korea may yet be the lull before a still brewing tempest.

East Asia Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), North Korea Onset of Multiparty Democracy in Maldives September 03, 2005 Alok Bansal

June 2, 2005 will go down as a red lettered day in the history of Maldives. On this day, the Maldivian parliament voted to allow multi-party democracy for the first time in the tiny atoll nation that has been ruled by President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom since 1978. The parliament unanimously approved a resolution to allow political parties to seek recognition and contest elections, ending the no-party system in the nation. The motion was moved on the basis of a request from President Gayoom to review its earlier decision not to allow political parties in the country. The main opposition Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) termed this to be a revolution and stated that they looked forward to an exciting political future. However, the passing of the resolution was not without its own attendant drama. On the morning of the parliamentary debate, the authorities arrested four key dissidents on allegations of plotting to disrupt the proceedings in Parliament, raising fears that the government may scuttle the proposed reforms again. The four were released immediately after the vote.

The fact that the government allowed Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) leader Mohamed Nasheed – popularly called as Anni – to return to Male on April 30 had indicated the government’s commitment to the establishment of multiparty democracy. Though the government had vacillated in the past on the question of democratic reforms, it soon realised that the establishment of multiparty democracy was an idea whose time had come. For its part, the MDP has been quick to claim credit for the development and stated that it was due to its pressure that the resolution was passed. Earlier in May President Gayoom, when he arrived for a meeting at the United Nations Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, was confronted by protesters including volunteers from ‘Friends of Maldives,’ a group based in Salisbury. The protestors shouted slogans about the need for improved human rights and an end to torture and political oppression in the Maldives.

The past two years have been tumultuous; political dissent has been building up and often found expression in sudden bursts of violence. 2004 was an especially landmark year for the Maldives. The smallest state of South Asia was not only hit by tsunami that derailed the fastest growing economy in the region, but it also faced many political tremors. Political dissent, which had surfaced in late 2003, continued to change the political landscape. In the face of protests from the opposition, President Gayoom declared a state of emergency in August 2004, arresting many pro-democracy activists and using tear gas to disperse thousands of protesters who rallied in a rare show of dissent in the capital Male, which houses approximately one third of the island nation’s population. The tsunami that struck Maldives diffused to some extent the animus that had been generated between the supporters and opponents of President Gayoom. The elections that took place on January 2005, clearly demonstrated that a significant section of society was opposed to the policies of the government and was clamouring for a multiparty democracy. Faced with international pressure and demands from dissidents in exile, President Gayoom promised democratic reforms after these elections. It would however be useful to recollect the salient developments that took place in the nation during the last two years, which ultimately led to the introduction of multiparty elections.

The democracy movement in Maldives has its genesis in the events of September 2003 when the death of a detainee in Maafushi Island prison provoked rioting, which was brutally suppressed by the security forces resulting in the death of three more inmates. Consequent unrest led to widespread protests against the government in the capital, the first ever during President Gayoom’s tenure of over 25 years. A number of government buildings were attacked. Large numbers of demonstrators were arrested and an investigation was ordered into the deaths of the prisoners. The police commissioner and the Deputy Head of the National security Service (NSS), Brigadier Adam Zahir, was removed.

President Gayoom was re-elected by the Majlis for a sixth five-year term in September 2003 and was ratified in a national referendum receiving 90.3 per cent of the votes. In November 2003 President Gayoom dismissed from cabinet the Attorney General Dr Mohamed Munavvar and the Minister of Planning and National Development Ibrahim Hussain Zaki. The two were allegedly removed for supporting reformers attempting to register a political party. In November 2003 MDP, which had been prevented from registering as a political party in Maldives, was established abroad by London and Colombo based dissidents. Some clerics also extended support to this group. In February, 2004 activists of MDP were arrested in Male to prevent a planned march by opposition activists.

Elections were held in May 2004 for a People’s Special Majlis (constitutional assembly) with the purpose of amending the constitution. Voters chose 42 members out of 120 independent candidates, as political parties are not recognised. The President nominated another eight members to the council. The People’s Special Majlis also included members of the People’s Majlis and the Council of Ministers. In early June President Gayoom announced his agenda for constitutional reforms, which would allow political parties, limiting the term of the President to two five-year tenures, more powers for the Parliament, creating the post of Prime Minister and separating the judiciary, legislature and executive. He also suggested that women should be allowed to stand for the presidency and agreed to renounce the right to appoint eight members of the People’s Majlis. The People’s Special Majlis, which was sworn in on 15 June and convened on 19 July, was immediately suspended as 24 members walked out and raised anti government slogans. The dissidents continued to carry out protest marches and meetings unchallenged till early August 2004.

On August 11, 2004, a Wahabi cleric Farid was arrested on charges of unauthorised preaching. Some of his supporters followed him from the court to the NSS headquarters. MDP leaders and Islamic fundamentalists soon joined them, and together they organized a vigil outside the NSS headquarters for the release of the political prisoners. Despite repeated appeals to disperse, the crowd continued to swell and speeches became more anti-government. By the night of August 12, 2004, the crowd had soared to about 4000, which is more than five per cent of the population of Male and had started demanding removal of hardliner ministers and the resignation of the President. It is alleged by the government that some clerics at the meeting called the tourist resorts as unIslamic and demanded their closure. The attempt by the crowd to storm the NSS headquarters led to the stabbing of some policemen and the arrest of 200 anti government activists. The Government termed the demonstrations as a ‘coup attempt’ and imposed an indefinite state of emergency on August 13, 2004. Armoured Personnel Carriers were deployed and telephone and Internet services were temporarily suspended. The opposition MDP accused the government of ‘ruthlessly suppressing dissent’. An EU fact finding team invited by the President expressed concern about the continuing detention without charges of the alleged protestors and the ongoing state of emergency. By early September most people had been released while about 60 continued in detention, which included the former Attorny-General Dr Mohamed Munavvar and some members of the People’s Special Majlis. On September 1, 2004 amidst international criticism for suppression of the August demonstrations, President Gayoom relinquished the Defence and Finance portfolios.

In December 2004, Gayoom’s government charged four dissidents — including former planning minister Ibrahim Zaki — with coup for attempting to overthrow the president. A conviction could mean a life sentence for all four accused. The Majlis elections scheduled on non-party basis were postponed initially to December 2004 and when the tsunami hit the islands to January 22, 2005. The special Majlis, which had been tasked to develop a new constitution, has virtually remained in suspended animation since its inauguration on July 19, 2004.

In the January elections held on non-party basis, 70 per cent of the 156,766 eligible voters cast their votes. All the 20 atolls and the capital Male elected two legislators each. MDP claimed that it won 18 of the 42 seats, with pro-government candidates winning 22 and independents two. But the government claims that at least 30 candidates are pro-government, and only eight are pro-MDP. The figures cannot be reconciled because all candidates officially ran as independents, although most voters know their political leanings. The election of a large number of opposition candidates especially from Male has increased the pressure on President Gayoom. The fact that the opposition members represent the constituencies with most number of electorates and in terms of electorates represented the combined opposition members probably represent more electorates than the government members, put the President in a tight spot.

In the past, reforms and the promised transition to multiparty democracy had progressed slowly in fits and starts. As the existing political system favours the status quo, the opposition had tried to depict President Gayoom as a despot, who was not willing change lest he loses power. But with the passage of the parliamentary resolution clearing the way for multiparty democracy, he has proved them wrong. Three political parties including the ruling party have been accorded the pre-registration status and are expected to be recognized as political parties by end August. The parties are the MDP led by Mohamed Nasheed, Maldives Peoples Party of Gayoom supporters and Islamic Democratic Party (IDP) led by former police sergeant Umar Naseer. By clearing the way for multiparty democracy, Gayoom has shown that he was always committed to reforms and the establishment of multiparty democracy was now an irreversible process. He has stated that he expected the reform process to be completed this year so that the country could begin 2006 with a new constitution.

East Asia Maldives, Democracy Bangladesh Blasts: Wake up call August 24, 2005 C Uday Bhaskar

A series of 434 bomb blasts that rocked as many as 60 of 64 districts in Bangladesh on August 17 may have been 'mild' by way of the number killed – just two people – but the symbolism is very significant and perhaps inversely proportional to the damage caused.

Leaflets recovered from some of the blast sites demanded that the country become more Islamic and the needle of suspicion points to the banned Islamic group, the Jamaat-ul- Mujahedin. And while investigations are continuing, the implications of this incident are of potentially grave import.

All the blasts were synchronised to take place within 30 minutes of each other and the targets in most cases were symbols of the state – government buildings, local courts and revenue offices. The fact that such detailed co-ordination could be effected in a largely rural country with poor infrastructure and communication links may point to two inferences. One, that the mobile phone has empowered Bangladesh in an unintended manner and two, that there was a colossal failure of intelligence or – worse still – that there was some collusion from within the security apparatus of the state.

Either exigency is cause for deep concern since it was expected that there would be some disturbances in this period given the fact that the 30th anniversary of the assassination of the late Mujibur Rehman – the founder of Bangladesh – was being observed on August 15. The moot question is whether the BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) government headed by Begum Khaleda Zia is unwilling or unable to deal with the scourge of religious radicalism and related extremism, or are some elements within the government tacitly allowing such organised violence?

The August 17 incident was preceded by a rash of attacks with religious right-wing overtones leavened by the deep chasm that permeates political discourse in Bangladesh with the two major parties-the BNP and the AL (Awami League)-being deeply divided over a host of issues.

It may be recalled that on August 21 last year, an AL rally was subjected to grenade attacks that killed 21 people, including senior political leader Ivy Rahman, and it was fortuitous that more members of the party were not among the casualties.

Liberal opinion in Bangladesh is anguished over these twin trends. The first is the inflexible mutual hostility that the two major parties have maintained, wherein every major issue is polarised along party lines; and the second is the growing nexus between religious right wing groups and the ruling party. The AL lost the 2001 election to the BNP which had aligned itself with the Jamaat and the Islamic Oikya Jote (Islamic Unity Council).

The Islamic Oikya Joten (IOJ) established in 1990 comprises seven parties: Khelafat Majlis, Nezam-e-Islam, Faraizi Jamaat, Islami Morcha, Ulama Committee, a splinter group of National Awami Party (Bhasani), and Islami Shashantantra Andolo. Its main aim is reportedly to establish an Islamic polity based upon Islamic jurisprudence and the Khilafat. Over the years, the BNP partners have used the message of divisive and sectarian Islam to mobilise the rural populace in the villages of the country, thereby shrinking the vote bank of the more moderate AL. The Jamaat and the IOJ together obtained 20 seats out of 300 in the 2001 general elections and are now an assertive part of the BNP-led ruling coalition in Dhaka.

According to local reports, the Jamaat's rallying slogan is 'amra hawbo Bangladesh, Bangla hobay Afghan' - meaning 'we will become Taliban, Bangladesh will become Afghanistan'.

Many Islamic states have witnessed a gradual increase in the ascendancy of religious parties in their domestic polities and Bangladesh is no exception. Since the early 1990s, there has been a supra-national ideological motivation for right wing Islamic religiosity and the emergence of an international Islamic front espousing a rigid Wahabi strain of Islam and supported by funds from Saudi Arabia and other states has incrementally became part of the global canvas.

The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s with the al-Qaida at the core is the more visible manifestation of this trend. In South Asia, this pattern received further impetus from the military establishment in Pakistan and, given the deep linkages between the Pakistani ISI and the right wing groups in Bangladesh – particularly the Jammat-e- Islami (which incidentally supported Pakistan in 1971 during the war for the liberation of Bangladesh), these parties became more effective and spawned militant splinter groups.

The greater irony is that the government in Dhaka has been steadfastly refusing to acknowledge that such groups exist in Bangladesh and has preferred to do the ostrich act despite evidence to the contrary that has been presented by various intelligence agencies, including those from the US and UK among others. In a candid comment, Bangladesh's leading newspaper, the Daily Star, observed editorially (August 21) of the spate of terrorist attacks: "The one benefit to come out of the unspeakable tragedy was supposed to be that it rammed home the fact that there are dangerous extremists in our midst and that the government needed to take serious action to safeguard the nation."

Left unchecked, this trend of growing radicalism in Bangladesh leading to motivated violence can result in a very destabilising situation wherein the electoral process can be hijacked to suit the interests of the right-wing religious extremists.

This would be very undesirable for the region as a whole and enlightened moderation is urgently called for in the internal discourses of Bangladesh. The argumentative characteristic that noted economist Amartaya Sen has examined in some detail in the Indian context had its greatest exponents in Bengali tradition and now more than ever, the liberal spectrum in Bangladesh will have to determinedly debate over which fork in the post 9-11 road their country will take.

August 17 should serve as both wake-up call and a much needed inoculation.

South Asia Bangladesh, Jamaat-ul-Mujahedin, Terrorism The Indo-US nuclear deal has generated a lot of heat: here’s why August 04, 2005 Rajiv Nayan

The July 2005 visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Washington has been eventful as far as nuclear issues are concerned. The joint statement, various speeches, briefings, and interactions have given a new direction to the nuclear policies and postures of both India and the United States (US). Of course, much heat has also been generated in both the countries. It is necessary, therefore, to provide some clarity to the heated debate. Is it a sell out/ surrender to the US or a big victory?

On the surface, it may appear to some that the nuclear weapon state status has once again eluded India, but in reality, there are impressive strides in that direction. Although, the US can influence other NPT countries, still it alone cannot amend the NPT to designate India as a nuclear weapon country. Moreover, in May 2005, the US had to face a tough time in the NPT Review Conference. Hopefully, in future, the legal hurdle may also be overcome with other countries.

India struggled to get a new designation—for itself and for other nuclear countries as well. This new category—responsible state with advanced nuclear technology—has jointly been coined by India and the predominant power of the contemporary international system, US. In the paragraph in which President George Bush appreciates India for its strong commitment to checking the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), he mentions: “As a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire same benefits and advantages as other such states.”

The account of the Indian Prime Minister in the joint statement is equally relevant. He states: “...India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. These responsibilities and practices consist of identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and filing a declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)...”

So far, the literature on the subject does not have any precedence of such a category. The Annex 2 of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty alludes to countries that figured in Table 1 of IAEA’s December 1995 edition of “Nuclear Research Reactors in the World”. There are 44 countries listed in it with nuclear reactors.

Moreover, no non-nuclear weapon state has been given the privilege of separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes by IAEA or the existing non-proliferation regime. This privilege lies only with the five NPT defined nuclear weapon countries. Only nuclear weapon countries can submit the list of separated civil nuclear facilities.

That the existing NPT categorisation of nuclear weapon states has been replaced by a new designation and definition through the joint statement has been comprehended quickly by the Western media. The Economist has called the new designation as an ‘euphemism’ for bomb holding countries. In the US, except for a few non-proliferation hardliners, other strategists, long reconciled to the Indian bomb, seem to have accepted the new designation.

However, in India, the realisation of the significance of the designation has taken time to sink in. The struggle for the nuclear weapon country status was to overcome the restriction on the supply of dual-use and high technology—not for some superficial international prestige. If other US allies and countries follow what the US has done, India’s real objective for getting the designation will easily be fulfilled. The relevant supplier countries are sending positive signals. Even the UK has fallen in line. The UK advanced technology industry will support a liberal approach to India on this matter. We can easily recollect how the UK had worked with the US administration to supply spare parts of Sea King helicopters when the US had imposed sanctions on India for the 1998 series of nuclear tests.

The assurance of the Indian PM in the joint statement that it would sign and adhere to ‘an additional protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities’ also invited apprehension and criticism from some segments inside India. It is true that the additional protocol is designed to be very intrusive, but nuclear weapon countries have signed different and highly diluted additional protocols with IAEA.

The deal must, therefore, be seen with cautious optimism. This is a partial victory. The real challenges are ahead when negotiations for the real contents of the joint statement start. The Indian strategic community must orient itself for the future. The next phase of debate must start to safeguard our national security, technology and energy-related interests in the coming months/years.

Nuclear and Arms Control India-US Relations, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Nuclear The Chatham House Report and the British Government July 25, 2005 Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay

New Delhi July 25 A Briefing Paper published by the independent British think tank, The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), has become an embarrassment for the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair even as Britain is trying to overcome the shock of the terrorist attacks on July 7 in London claiming the lives of more than fifty as well as the foiled attacks on July 21. The Briefing Paper for July 2005 titled “Security, Terrorism and the UK” says:

The UK is at particular risk because it is the closest ally of the United States, has deployed armed forces in the military campaigns to topple the Taleban regime in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and has taken a leading role in international intelligence, police and judicial cooperation against Al-Qaeda and in efforts to suppress its finances.

The report clearly states that extremists have been recruited and deployed within British borders and that for an open society like the UK it is really difficult to prevent the sudden co-ordinated suicide bombings bearing the trademark of Al-Qaeda. However, what Tony Blair would have found even more embarrassing is the depiction by the authors of the report, Frank Gregory and Paul Wilkinson of the UK, as a pillion rider of a powerful ally and their conclusion that the ride in fact has proved costly in terms of British, US military personnel and Iraqi civilians killed as well as the damage to the counter-terrorism campaign.

Getting termed as a pillion rider would certainly not be gratifying for the British government, because the report questions the whole rationale of the War against Iraq. Observers may recall the tumultuous days of 2003 when in spite of the sad episode of suicide of the British weapons expert, David Kelly, resignations of ministers from the British cabinet and mass anti-War demonstrations in European cities did not prevent the “Coalition of the Willing” led by the UK in Europe to go ahead with the War against Iraq. As expected, the British government has not shared the assessment of Chatham House. The British government spokesman was rhetorical when he asserted that there have been attacks in twenty-six countries over the past twelve years and questioned whether the report (of Chatham House) was simply suggesting that the UK should have put her head down and hope not to be attacked?

Nevertheless, can it be denied that there have been not enough indications that a terrorist attack might take place in the UK? After 9/11 and especially after Britain went to War in Iraq, there have been regular warnings about possible terrorist attacks in the UK. The threat seemed to be more imminent given the considerable presence of Islamic dissidents from West Asia and rabid Islamic preachers in London. These radical Islamists have been continuing their activities in London though toned down but almost uncontrolled even after 9/11. In February 2004 Stephen Ulph of the Terrorism Monitor termed the British capital as Londonistan. Very recently the German security portal, Sicherheit-Heute (Security Today) depicted London as “Metropolis of Islamic International”. The Chatham House report is right in its observation:

By the mid-1990s the UK’s intelligence agencies and the police were well aware that London was increasingly being used as a base by individuals involved in promoting, funding and planning terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere. However, these individuals were not viewed as a threat to the UK’s national security, and so they were left to continue their activities with relative impunity, a policy which caused much anger among the foreign governments concerned.

Moreover, recent experience are that British Jihadis have been found in Iraq and Israel ready to take part in terrorist attacks or for suicide bombings. Given these early warnings and disturbing incidents, it seemed that the British government had perhaps taken the situation a little bit casually. In contrast, for the masterminds of these terrorist attacks on July 7, the timing couldn’t have been more opportune to attack the British government when: the UK had taken over the rotating half-yearly European presidency just seven days earlier and London had snatched the Olympic bid from its traditional rival, Paris.

One would find the assessment of Chatham House rather justified if the whole internal security situation in Europe is taken into account. In fact, 2004 was a remarkable year in recent European history as far as its internal security is concerned. If the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004 claiming 191 lives were an indication of the capability of Islamic sleeper cells in Europe to successfully orchestrate attacks on such a large scale, the brutal killing of the controversial Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh on November 2, 2004 in broad daylight in Amsterdam emphasised the accomplishment of a lone terrorist to execute his plan unhindered. In the case of Theo van Gogh it must be mentioned that he had been under continuous threat by Islamists prior to his killing. The co-producer of Theo van Gogh’s last controversial film “Submission”, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the Somalia-born Dutch Member of Parliament, has for months been facing death threats and under state protection. However, in both the cases of Madrid and Amsterdam the findings are almost the same: the perpetrators are mostly young, belong to the immigrants’ community or have dual citizenships, do not have any terrorist antecedents or even if they were earlier apprehended or approached by the authorities, the reasons were petty crime.

At present it appears that the British government would not undertake a serious revision of its Iraq Policy. Simultaneously, given the unipolar moment it is also not possible for the UK to exchange the driver’s seat with pillion riding in the Coalition against Terror. Hence the likely British action to prevent further terrorist attacks would be three-pronged: (i) to legislate stringent anti-terrorism laws; (ii) to enhance intelligence and police cooperation internationally and specifically with European nations; (iii) to increase dialogue with the 1.6 million strong Muslim population in Britain.

Regarding the cooperation at European level, there is already a Solidarity Clause under Part I, Article I-43 with implementation in Article III-329 in the European Constitution (Article 42 with Article III-329 in the Draft Constitution of 2003). The Clause highlights the solidarity of member states in case of a terrorist attack in one of the member countries. Moreover, after the Madrid terrorist attacks a post of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator was also created for effective counter-terrorism coordination. But the recent rejections of the European Constitution in the French and Dutch referenda and the subsequent one year period of reflection on the future as decided by the EU leadership, the most important issue of European integration in security affairs is likely to experience delays. Justice and Home Affairs, which constitute the third pillar of the EU, still remains the contentious issue amongst the member countries. Cooperation amongst the European intelligence agencies would also face hindrances because of traditional rivalries and distrust.

Therefore, at this point the primary onus of tackling indigenous threats and preventing further terrorist attacks would certainly lie with the British government. Undoubtedly London in recent times has become the safe sanctuary of all the West-Asia based radical Islamic organisations, global Islamic movements, individual hate preachers and Islamic indoctrinators. Given the liberal atmosphere of the British system, legal hurdles, lack of harmonisation in common EU counter-terrorism efforts it is very difficult to try or eventually extradite an individual charged for inciting hatred, communal disharmony or even Jihad. Recent instances like Abu Hamza in Britain and Metin Kaplan in Germany are clear instances of hardship faced by the government authorities to legally extradite a convicted individual outside Europe. The European Arrest Warrant, which could have been an effective tool to combat intra-EU crime and terrorist activities, is not yet accepted by all the EU member nations. On the contrary, the German Constitutional Court this week ruled the European Arrest warrant as null and void.

Consequently the primary task of the British government should be to not ignore the Chatham House report on principle, but rather to formulate time-bound, concrete measures to deal with these hate preachers and indoctrinators who otherwise have been under observation of European agencies. Except investigative stories on unearthing serious issues pertaining to British and European security, European mainstream media may also ponder over providing prominence to these publicity-mongering individuals.

Nuclear and Arms Control Al Qaeda, United Kingdom, Terrorism Good Day for India? July 25, 2005 C Uday Bhaskar

The joint statement issued at the Manmohan Singh-Bush summit held in Washington (July 18) has generated considerable interest and anxiety in both countries for the manner in which it has addressed the nuclear issue. It merits recall that the nuclear determinant has bedeviled the bi-lateral relationship between the US and India for well over three decades since India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974 – which was further exacerbated after the May 1998 Shakti nuclear tests that gave India a de facto nuclear weapon status. The recent agreement has the potential to radically alter the perception of the nuclear nettle with considerable benefit to India's energy requirements and the relevance accorded to Delhi in the international nuclear comity.

The global community led by the US had introduced the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 and the world was divided into the five Nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the remainder who are deemed to be non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) – for eternity. India, Pakistan and Israel have remained outside the NPT fold and each of the three has a distinctive nuclear pedigree and profile in the global calculus. Consequently they have been kept outside the global nuclear strategic and trade loop and have been treated as outcasts – however unjustified this may be – for they have broken no law by staying outside the NPT fold. But this is a reflection of the realpolitik that underpins the international systemic.

The US had maintained an inflexible 'roll-back, cap, eliminate' stand apropos India's nuclear aspirations and anxieties since 1998 and earlier. Till the end of the Clinton Presidency in early 2001, the nuclear issue remained intractable in the India-US bi-lateral context. After the arrival of the Bush team in the White House in January 2001, there has been a radical transformation in US nuclear policy beginning with the rejection of the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and later the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty – actions which were driven by the perceived US national interest, as interpreted by the Republican party.

Simultaneously the Bush team hinted that they would arrive at a squaring of the circle in terms of India's nuclear profile and this was accelerated by the events of 9-11 and the AQ Khan revelations. Many high level dialogues were conducted by the professionals on both sides leading to the creation of the NSSP (Next Steps in Strategic Partnership) framework that examined the potential for co-operation in civilian nuclear energy, space, hi-tech commerce and a dialogue on missile defences. Begun by the Vajpayee led NDA government when India indicated that it could enter into a give and take arrangement that would tacitly admit India into the global nuclear fold, this reached fruition in the July 18 statement.

The relevant paragraph is quoted in detail given its import and the significance of each word. In the preamble, the US agreed to recognize India as a 'responsible' state with 'advanced nuclear technology' and that it would be accorded appropriate facilitation for its civilian nuclear programmes and its energy requirements in particular. In return

"The (Indian) Prime Minister conveyed that for his part, India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. These responsibilities and practices consist of identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and filing a declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities; continuing India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread; and ensuring that the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines."

The operative phrase here is "reciprocally agree" to what has been enumerated and the conditionality would be similar to what would devolve upon other NWS – such as China in the Asian context. This framework is no different from what the NDA government had mooted during its dealings with the Clinton administration but at the time the US led by the Democrat Party (with a strong non-proliferation trait) was unwilling to budge from its stated position. However the Bush team has taken a very bold and radical step to accommodate India and this shift is testimony to the personal determination that Mr. Bush has arrived at by way of improving the bi-lateral relationship with India.

Against this backdrop, the anxiety that has been generated on both sides is understandable. The non-proliferation ayatollahs in the US and elsewhere are livid that India which was castigated for its May 1998 tests has been 'let off the hook'. The first major broadside has been fired by Mr. Strobe Talbott, the former US Deputy Secretary of State in the Clinton administration and the principal American interlocutor with the NDA government who has opined of the India-US nuclear deal as "Good Day for India, Bad for Non-Proliferation." (See www.YaleGlobal July 21, 2005). While Russia and France have been supportive, UK has conveyed its objection to the accommodation proposed by the US. The Chinese response will also be critical by way of the consensus among the major nuclear weapon states within the NPT fold. And it is expected that Pakistan will seek similar dispensation as India. To that extent patient negotiations will be called for before the sequencing of activities between India and the US on one hand, and the global nuclear cartels on the other, is arrived at. This will be contested but it does not seem improbable at this stage.

In India there is anxiety that the core national interest has been compromised and that this is the beginning of the end of India's autonomy in the nuclear domain. This position is untenable if the fine print of the July 18 statement is examined. The US has not accepted India as a de jure NWS as per the NPT framework. It has only accorded India a tacit de facto status so that India's civilian nuclear programme is given appropriate support and its burgeoning energy requirements are addressed. This incidentally has become critical if India's GDP growth rate and enhancement of per capita income is to be sustained – let alone improved upon. To that extent it could be asserted that India's economic and energy security mandated this give-and-take arrangement proposed in the July 18 statement. By agreeing to assume certain protocols mandated by the IAEA (of which body India is an important member) there would be no intrusive inspections – as is feared. The anxiety in India is that once the thin end of the wedge is allowed by way of access to the global community, then the roof will cave in. This fear is counter-factual, emotive and exaggerated. It does little credit to the tenacity of the Indian politico-nuclear-diplomatic establishment who have successfully defended the Indian interest during periods of dire adversity by way of the opprobrium that Delhi's perceived obduracy had elicited for decades. The exact details of what India will identify for such scrutiny – as applicable to other NWS – is yet to negotiated. But it will be 'no more and no less' than applicable to other NWS.

India has already entered into 13 agreements with the IAEA beginning December 1966 till March 1994 for the management and regulation of some of its nuclear facilities as required by the relevant international norms. This is imperative – for Delhi cannot sustain its civilian nuclear programmes in a totally insular and stand alone manner. The July 18 statement is important for it alters the perception about India in the global nuclear domain – an initiative led by Mr. Bush and the US administration – and the benefits for India in the long run are potentially enormous and will grow. The paradigm shift is that the nuclear issue that had become a bone of bitter contention in the India-US bi-lateral relationship now has the potential for becoming an arena for mutually beneficial co- operation.

The separation of facilities into military and civilian is common practice among the NWS and there are country specific agreements that individual states enter into with the IAEA. And this possibility is not new in the Indian context. It is almost two decades old and was first mooted by the late Dr. Raja Ramanna – one of the doyens of India's nuclear establishment – and a professional whose understanding of the Indian interest in matters nuclear is second to none. For sure there will be differing technical assessments among the nuclear scientific professionals but reconciling them with the imperatives of the day is part of the Indian democratic ethos.

It is also misleading to infer that the proposed arrangement will lead to a 'cap' of the Indian nuclear arsenal. Post May 1998 the NDA government had stood by the no-first-use policy and the commitment to a credible, minimum deterrent and a self-imposed moratorium on further testing. Nuclear restraint was and is the Indian USP. One assumes that the NDA government had arrived at a determination about how much fissile material India would need for the medium term and accordingly India entered into the FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) under UN auspices. This is all part of the Indian parliamentary record. Hence the suggestion by the luminaries of the NDA at this stage that the July 18 agreement is tantamount to a jeopardizing of the Indian strategic capability is perplexing and counter-factual.

However India has a track record of intense debate and contestation about the nuclear issue as part of its democratic DNA and this is unique. No other nuclear weapon state has had such a candid debate and this is gratifying. The nuclear issue in India has traditionally been dealt with in a very guarded manner – and given the apocalyptic destructive potential of the 'nuke bomb' it is encouraging that the matter is receiving this degree of illumination and critical attention. At the end of the day, the nuclear option – when exercised by any state (including India) is a dishonourable one, even if it is inescapable – for it goes against the normative humanism that should be the Holy Grail for those managing this diabolical capability on behalf of their states. And to that extent total nuclear disarmament – however elusive – should remain the lodestar as PM Manmohan Singh reiterated in Washington.

The July 18 agreement at this stage does not compromise India in the nuclear domain in any manner. It has the potential to admit India into the global fold of nuclear commerce and strategic management and will advance India's overall national interest through the next few decades of the 21st century. The issue needs objective assessment as opposed to emotive, counter-factual Pavlovian reflexes that generate more heat than light.

Nuclear and Arms Control India-US Relations, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Nuclear Will US Congress Back Bush on India’s N-plan? July 20, 2005 Rajiv Nayan

On July 18, India and the United States released a joint statement delineating the multi- dimensional aspects of the bilateral relationship.

The joint statement underlines the evolving relationship of the two countries. There are a number of ritualistic phrases and statements besides some firsts and interesting provisions.

The understanding reached by the two countries on nuclear matters is definitely a very important feature of the joint statement. The US administration has agreed to “work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as it realises its goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving energy security”.

The American promise intends to go beyond the Tarapur fuel supply issue. As there are a number of American legislations and regulations that may come in the way of the US President George Bush’s move to achieve fruition of the “full civil nuclear energy cooperation” with India, he made it clear in the statement that agreement would be sought “from Congress to adjust US laws and policies”.

The joint statement also mentions that the US would work with its allies to adjust international regimes, the Generation IV International Forum and projects such as ITER (the International Thermo-nuclear Experimental Reactor). The media and analysts are busy all over the world studying the implications. Questions have been raised: Can India get what it wants? If yes, when, if no, why?

A section of the US media and some analysts flashed the news that the US Congressmen were shocked when they learnt of the concessions that were made by the administration to India.

Most of them quoted Democratic Congressmen like Ed Markey to build the argument that the adjustment of the laws and policies in relation to India would be tough.

There should not be any doubt that the joint statement merely reflects the intentions and wishes of the US administration. The interplay of different interest groups and forces of the US policy-making bodies, especially in the Congress, is quite vital for the final delivery.

However, the US media and other serious analysts are recognising, in a big way, the fact that geo-political considerations will ultimately determine the outcome.

Most American analysts are of the opinion that the non-proliferation lobby is not so much against India as it is against North Korea and Iran.

India has demonstrated, by and large, an impeccable non-proliferation record. This has helped in building a positive constituency for itself inside the US and elsewhere.

Neo-conservatives, the most vocal section of non-proliferation activism and always ready to recommend a pre-emptive strike against the ‘proliferating’ countries, have responded positively to the statement.

A scholar at the prominent neo-conservative think-tank, American Enterprise Institute, captures the gist of the dilemma of the American non-proliferation lobby in the statement in an American newspaper. He finds that “there is a lot of hand-wringing from the non-proliferation community. But this is the price of admission to a deeper partnership with India. There is risk associated with this. But it tells you how seriously the Bush administration is taking this as a strategic relationship.”

In the US Congress, both the chambers have got a majority in the Republican party. Although there is no guarantee that these Congressmen will vote on partisan lines, there is a still greater probability of their doing so.

Moreover, the opposition to the agreement by some Democrat Congressmen should not mean that the whole party will vote en masse against the concessions to India.

We must remember that in the wake of the post-Pokhran crisis, the breakthrough in the relationship was brought about by a Democrat President, Bill Clinton. There are people in the party who are well disposed to India.

At a time when India may be looking at the international market for cost-effective nuclear shopping, the positive assurance by the US can be extremely useful.

In India we may love, wish and argue for a multi-polar world, but the reality is that the international system is US-centric.

In multilateral regimes, it’s been found that the US puts up one barrier after another. France and Russia have generally been constructive. There can be a supply of the required goods from these countries too. Besides, the development may lead to India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. India has fulfilled all the criteria except one – membership of the group.

This criterion has safeguards. The Indian conditional acceptance of voluntary safeguards for segregated civilian nuclear facilities and the additional protocol may help to circumvent this clause.

For all practical purposes, the joint statement establishes India as a nuclear weapon country even though the phrase advanced nuclear technology state is used by way of a description. India may get all the advantages of a nuclear weapon state that is otherwise denied to it because of the crisis-ridden Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

Finally, it is difficult to predict the date of delivery of the denied items, but the potential of the delivery in the future is possible.

Simultaneously, the Indian establishment must not forget to calculate its cost, including what is incurred in last-minute bargaining. If the deal is costly, we should renegotiate it afresh. There is a lot of scope for this in the statement.

Nuclear and Arms Control India-US Relations, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Nuclear
Publication | Page 642 | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (2024)
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